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EIS Supplements for Improperly Completed Projects: A Logi-
cal Extension of Judicial Review Under NEPA 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) articu-
lates "a national policy [to] encourage productive and enjoyable har-
mony between man and his environment."2 The Act requires that a 
detailed statement concerning environmental consequences accom-
pany all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment."3 The Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) pro~des the procedural means to implement substantive 
NEPA policy4 - it informs the public of federal agency decisions 
affecting the environment, facilitates public input into such deci-
sions, and ensures that decision-makers give adequate consideration 
to environmental concerns.5 Accordingly, most NEPA litigation has 
focused on the preparation and adequacy of the EIS. 6 
Courts recognize an implied private right of action under 
NEP A.7 Several recent decisions, however, have denied relief where 
I. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976 & Supp. N 1980). 
2. 42 u.s.c. § 4321 (1976). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4332. The language of the section reads: 
(2) all agencies of the Federal government shall-
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-
tailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
Since this Note deals with completed projects, the word ''project" will be used as the functional 
equivalent of "major Federal action." 
4. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 431 F. Supp. 320, 323 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
5. See notes 28-42 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
6. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, 15-23 (1973). 
1. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); S.C.R.A.P. v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), applicationfar 
stay pending appeal denied sub nom. Aberdeen & R.R.R. v. S.C.R.A.P., 409 U.S. 1207 (1972), 
revd. and remanded on other grounds, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). See generally F. ANDERSON, supra 
note 6, at 16-17; w. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 716-18 (1977). But see Noe v. Metro-
politan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981) (denial of private cause of 
action). Noe relied in part on Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (denying 
an implied cause of a~on for damages under§ 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), 
and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (denying an implied cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610 
which prohibits corporations from making contributions in specified federal elections). The 
Supreme Court, however, has reviewed NEPA suits since Redington and Cort were decided, 
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the defendant completed the project before the plaintiff discovered 
the inadequacy of the EIS. 8 In each case, the completed project de-
viated significantly from its description in the EIS, and the changes 
were incorporated into the project without study or evaluation of 
any additional adverse environmental impact.9 These cases present 
what Judge Coffin described as a dilemma between "[t]he prospect 
that a violation of NEPA is insulated from remedy once the project 
is completed" and ''the implications of affording post-completion re-
lief where hindsight reveals inadequacies in an environmental im-
pact statement."10 
This Note argues that th(? private cause of action under NEPA 
retains its utility despite the completion of the project sued upon. 
Part I describes the procedural implementation of the policy con-
cerns underlying NEPA through the EIS process for proposed ac-
tions, and the EIS supplementation process for project changes made 
after the original EIS has been prepared. Part II examines current 
law applicable to projects completed in violation of NEPA 11 and 
concludes that the denial of post-completion relief conflicts with the 
underlying goals of NEPA. Part III analyzes extension of relief to 
completed projects, and proposes court-ordered EIS supplementa-' 
tion for projects completed in violation of NEPA. 
and has not foreclosed an implied private cause of action. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood 
Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Further, Noe cited Mountainbrook Homeowners Assn. 
v. Adams, IO ENVrL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 20352 (4th Cir. May 16,1980), and City ofBlue 
Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979), for support of its position. These cases, how-
ever, only denied post-completion relief, not the implied private cause of action. See generally 
Hart and Miller Islands Area Environmental Group v. Corps of Engineers, 505 F. Supp. 732, 
737-38 (D. Md. 1980) (analyzing the implied cause of action generally in light of recent 
Supreme Court decisions). 
8. See Richland Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1982); 
National Wildlife Fedn. v. Appalachian Regional Commn., 677 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Romulus v. County of Wayne, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980); Florida Wildlife Fedn. v. Gold-
schmidt, 611 F.2d 547 (1980); Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977). 
9. In City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979), the defendant prepared 
an EIS for an airport runway extension, incorporating a city promise that no jets would use the 
runway. The city changed its regulations to allow certain jet aircraft after the new runway was 
completed. In Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977), the Soil Conser-
vation Service implied that compatible fill would be used in a dune restoration project. The 
Service used incompatible fill which substantially altered the dune's appearance. In 
Mountainbrook Homeowners Assn. v. Adams, 492 F. Supp. 521 (W.D.N.C. 1979), '!lfd mem., 
620 F. 2d 294 (4th Cir. 1980), the plaintiffs alleged that disposal of waste rock from a highway 
project, which did not comply with the procedures specified in the EIS, adversely affected the 
environment. 
10. Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243, 245 (1st Cir. 1977). 
11. NEPA is violated if an agency significantly changes a project during construction with-
out supplementing the EIS. See Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243, 245 (1st Cir. 
1977). See also notes 43-45 i'!fra. 
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I. THE EIS REQUIREMENT 
NEPA resulted from a consensus that the dangers posed to the 
environment by human behavior required new institutional struc-
tures to incorporate ecological values in the process of forming pub-
lic policy. 12 This need arose less from the political perceptions of a 
particular historical period than from inherent dynamics of private 
decision-making. 13 Just as the failure to internalize social costs leads 
to the economic undervaluation of public goods, so too the absence 
of concentrated constituencies friendly to the general interest in a 
clean environment leads to its political undervaluation.14 NEPA re-
sponds to this failure of the democratic process by requiring decison-
makers first to consider, and then to justify, the environmental con-
sequences of their actions. NEPA does not attempt to dictate the 
result of any particular decision; rather, the Act establishes a policy 
regime in which decision-making must take account of environmen-
tal values. This procedural approach leaves to the political process 
12. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy: Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 
Befare the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1969) (State-
ment of Senator Jackson, sponsor ofS. 1075, the bill which ultimately became NEPA) (''There 
was, however, general agreement by all concerned [at the hearings] that there is a need to 
restructure the Federal government to provide a focal point for environmental considera-
tions."); S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969) (''In the past, environmental factors 
have frequently been ignored and omitted from consideration in the early stages of planning 
because of the difficulty of evaluating them in comparison with economic and technical fac-
tors. As a result, unless the results of planning are radically revised at the policy level - and 
this often means the Congress - environmental enhancement opportunities may be forgone 
and unnecessary degradation incurred."); id. at 9 (''Virtually every agency of the Federal Gov-
ernment plays some role in determining how well the environment is managed. Yet, many of 
these agencies do not have a mandate, a body of law, or a set of policies to guide their actions 
which have an impact on the environment."). 
13. ''Extemality'' is the economic term which refers to an excess of social over private cost. 
Because public goods, such as air and water, are financially free, their pollution imposes no 
corresponding cost on private polluters. The public at large bears the social cost, encouraging 
pollution so long as it yields a positive marginal private return. See generally W. BAUMOL & 
W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975); J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROP-
ERTY AND PRICES (1968); A. FREEMAN, R. HAVEMAN & A. KNEESE, THE EcONOMICS OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICY 72-76 (1973). 
14. This is not to say that effective political groups do not support environmental causes, 
but rather that because individuals devote their political resources to further their private in-
terests, policy-makers who respond to political incentives will incorporate the same undervalu-
ation of the environment that characterizes their constituents. See generally R. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 405 (1977). One need not endorse Posner's model of legislation, 
however, to realize that those who benefit from particular government programs have a stake 
in them sufficient to justify political defense of that interest. Only rarely will any individual's 
stake in an environmental issue rise to the level that might justify significant political activity. 
NEPA's legislative history reflects this concern, not that decision-makers are hostile to, but 
instead are indifferent to, environmental considerations. See,• e.g., S. REP. No. 296, supra note 
12, at 9 ("One of the major factors contributing to environmental abuse and deterioration is 
that actions - often having irreversible consequences - are undertaken without adequate 
consideration of, or knowledge about, their impact on the environment."); id. at 20 (''Many of 
the environmental controversies of recent years have, in large measure, been caused by the 
failure to consider all relevant points of view in the planning and conduct of Federal activi-
ties. . • • Too often planning is the exclusive province of the engineer and cost analyst."). 
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the determination of whether the government has properly weighed 
those values against the other social values with which they 
compete.15 
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA 16 requires17 federal agencies to com-
ply with a detailed study and disclosure procedure ("EIS process")18 
upon undertaking any major19 federa120 action which significantly 
affects the environment. This process begins with the preparation of 
a draft EIS.21 The draft EIS, like the final EIS, must describe the 
15. See, e.g., Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (''The detailed statement serves to gather in one 
place a discussion of the relevant impact of alternatives so that the reasons for the choice of 
alternatives are clear."); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973) ("[T]he requirement 
of a detailed statement helps insure the integrity of the process of decision by precluding stub-
born problems or serious criticism from being swept under the rug."); Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972) (''The complete formal impact statement 
represents an accessible means for opening up the agency decision-making process and sub-
jecting it to critical evaluation by those outside the agency, including the public.") (emphasis in 
original); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 
728, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (Congress intended NEPA ''to make such decisionmaking more 
responsive and more responsible."). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
17. The language of NEPA§ 102(2) (42 U.S.C. § 4332) has been interpreted to mean that 
the agency must prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for any major federal 
action. The agency has no discretion over the requirements of the EIS process. See, e.g., 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115, (D.C. 
Cir. 1971); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 257 (W.D. Wash. 1972), injunction dissolved, 376 
F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Wash. 1974), qffd, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally F. AN· 
DERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 49-55 (1973). The agency retains discretion, however, over 
whether an EIS statement is required - that is, whether the action is a "major federal action" 
within the meaning of the Act. See generally F. ANDERSON, supra, at 56-141. 
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1976) establishes the Council on Environmental Quality 
("CEQ") and describes its composition and function. The CEQ promulgated guidelines detail-
ing the requirements of the EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (1980). These guidelines, however, are 
merely advisory, and do not have the force of law. Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 18 (1st 
Cir. 1980); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 58 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994, 422 
U.S. 1049 (1975); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Cf. Note, Intent or Impact: Proving JJiscriminalion Under Title VI of the Civil Rig/tis Act of 
1964, 80 :M1cH. L. REv. 1095, 1101-10 (1982) (discussing the distinction between legislative 
regulations, which are binding on courts, and interpretative regulations, which are merely enti-
tled to deference by the courts, in the context of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
19. What constitutes a major action must be assessed with a view towards the cumulative 
impact of the proposed action, related projects in the area, and further actions contemplated. 
See City ofRochesterv. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967,972 (2d Cir. 1976). Whether 
a specific action is major may depend on the amount of federal funds expended, number of 
people affected, length of time consumed, and extent of government planning involved. See 
Como-Falcon Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 465 F. Supp. 850,857 (D, Minn. 
1978), mod!fied on other grounds, 609 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). 
20. What constitutes a federal action has been construed liberally. Federal action includes 
not only actions directly undertaken by a federal agency or funded by the federal government, 
but those permitted or approved by the federal agency. See Chelsea Neighborhood Assn. v. 
United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378, 382-86 (2d Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 
F.2d 856, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976), revd on other grounds sub 
nom. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1980) (" 'major Federal 
action' includes actions . . . which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibil-
ity''); N. ORLOFF, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS 9 (1978). 
21. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (1980). 
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proposed action, its reasonably foreseeable impact on the environ-
ment, unavoidable adverse environmental effects, reasonable alter-
natives, long range effects on productivity, and any irreversible 
commitment of resources involved in the proposed action.22 The 
agency must circulate the draft EIS to other agencies and interested 
private parties,23 who may offer comments and suggestions. Finally, 
the agency must revise the draft EIS, addressing responsible com-
ments and suggestions,24 and distribute the final product to all inter-
ested parties. 25 An EIS which does not satisfy these requirements 
must be revised.26 If necessary, courts will enjoin projects pending 
compliance with the EIS process.27 
The EIS process promotes three fundamental NEPA objectives. 
First, the EIS enhances the quality of agency decisions.28 The EIS 
requirement assures not only that the agency itself will evaluate the 
proposed project and practical alternatives in light of environmental 
costs,29 but also that other federal agencies and private parties can 
provide input into the decision-making process.30 Only where the 
"agency decisionmaker has before him . . . all possible approaches 
to a particular project . . . is it likely that the most intelligent, opti-
mally beneficial decision will ultimately be made."31 And only 
where the law formally requires a decison-maker to acknowledge 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
23. See 40 C.F.R. § 1S03.1 (1980). 
24. See 40 C.F.R. § 1S03.4 (1980). 
25. See 40 C.F.R. § 1S02.19 (1980). 
26. See 40 C.F.R. § 1S02.9(a) (1980). 
27. See, e.g., State of Alaska v. Andrus, S80 F.2d 46S, 48S (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part and 
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978) 
(presumption in favor of injunctive relief); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 477 
F.2d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir. 1973) ("injunction is the vehicle through which the congressional 
policy behind NEPA can be effectuated"); Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 3S2 F. 
Supp. SO, 60 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
Where the cost of the delay outweighs the harm sought to be prevented, injunction is gen-
erally not allowed. See, e.g., Pie~ont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 
43S (5th Cir. 1981); State of Alaska v. Andrus, S80 F.2d at 48S-86. 
28. Sierra Club v. Morton, S10 F.2d 813, 819-20 (5th Cir. 197S); Trout Unlimited v. Mor-
ton, S09 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 128S (1st Cir. 1973); 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 3S0-S1 (8th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cli.lfs' 
Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
29. See, e.g., State of Alaska v. Andrus, S80 F.2d 46S, 474 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part and 
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978); 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, S66 F.2d 1060, 1071 (8th Cir. 1977); County of 
Suffolk v. ~ecretaiy of Interior, S62 F.2d 1368, 1384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). 
30. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, S41 F.2d 1292, 1299-300 
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 128S (1st Cir. 
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 3S1 (8th Cir. 1972). 
31. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 
F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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otherwise undefended environmental values will the general interest 
in those values influence the choice of policies. 
Second; the EIS allows the democratic process to function more 
efficiently by fully informing the public of federal agency decisions 
affecting the environment.32 Congress intended NEPA, at the very 
least, ''to make such decision.making more responsive and more re-
sponsible" to the electorate.33 In this sense, NEPA operates as a 
"full disclosure law.''34 NEPA does not dictate the choice of policies; 
but it does mandate that those who weigh environmental values 
must answer to the electorate for the balance that they strike. 
Finally, the EIS serves as a record for substantive review. In the 
event that an agency decision is challenged for noncompliance with 
NEPA, the EIS establishes the reasons for that decision and the ex-
tent to which environmental values influenced the policy formation 
process.35 
In addition to NEPA's procedural requirements, section 101 of 
the Act36 imposes substantive requirements on decision-makers. 
NEPA requires an agency to take a ''hard look" at environmental 
concerns and consider the environmental consequences of its deci-
sion,37 though the agency need not elevate environmental concerns 
above other policy considerations.38 A reviewing court may not sub-
stitute its own judgment for that of a federal agency,39 though a 
32. See cases cited supra note "30. 
33. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 325 F. 
Supp. 728, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
34. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir. 1973). 
35. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 477 F.2d 495, 507 
(4th Cir. 1973); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138-39 (4th Cir. 1971). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976), provides in relevant part: 
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing respon-
sibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other 
essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, func-
tions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may -
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for 
succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cultur-
ally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degrada-
tion, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heri-
tage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and 
variety of individual choice; · 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high 
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attain-
able recycling of depletable resources. 
37. Sierra Club v. Cavanaugh, 447 F. Supp. 427, 431 (D.S.D. 1978). See Strycker's Bay 
Neighborhood Council. Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980) (per curiam). 
38. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council. Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) 
(per curiam). 
39. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 
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court may enjoin40 a project where the agency has given "clearly 
insufficient weight" to environmental concems,41 or has made its de-
cision in an "arbitrary or capricious" manner.42 This judicial gloss 
on the Act effectuates the statute's purpose, not to ensure certain pol-
icy outcomes, but to guarantee that otherwise neglected environmen-
tal interests receive the respect they merit from public decision-
makers. 
Both procedural and substantive NEPA requirements continue 
throughout implementation of the proposed action. Council on En-
vironmental Quality43 guidelines require an agency to supplement 
an EIS if "[t]he agency makes substantial changes in the proposed 
action that are relevant to environmental concerns."44 The EIS sup-
plement45 promotes the same NEPA objective for project changes as 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519,555 (1978); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 
223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 
1073 (8th Cir. 1977); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States 
Army, 470 F.2d 289,300 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). 
40. The remedy for substantive noncompliance with NEPA is a court order enjoining the 
proposed project. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 356 (8th Cir. 
1972). In practice, however, no court has enjoined a project for substantive noncompliance 
with NEPA. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 470 
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Tennessee Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), ajfd per curiam, 492 F.2d 466 
(6th Cir. 1974); Conservation Socy. of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary ofTransp., 362 F. 
Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973), revd on other grounds, 53 I F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976); Lathan v. Brine-
gar, 506 F.2d 677, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing review only under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act). See generally F. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 258-65; W. RODGERS, supra note 7, 
at 738-50. The threat of substantive review, however, has prompted agencies to change signifi-
cantly and even abandon projects thought to be too environmentally costly. COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF SIX 
YEARS EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES (Appendix D) (1976). 
41. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1977); 
National Indian Youth Council v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 649, 666 (D.N.M. 1980), ajfd sub 
nom. National Indian Youth Council v. Watt, 664 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1981). 
42. The Administrative Procedure Act allows a court to set aside an "arbitrary [or] capri-
cious" agency decision. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). This standard applies to NEPA litigation. See, 
e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engrs. of the United States Army, 470 F.2d 
289, 298-99 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 971 (1973); Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners 
Assn. v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967; Chelsea Neighborhood 
Assns. v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. del(ied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974); South Louisiana 
Env. Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1980). This standard is intended to avoid 
substituting judicial values for agency values except in the most egregious cases. Strycker's 
Bay Neighborhood Council,_ Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam). 
43. See note 18 supra. 
44. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(l)(i) (1981). 
45. The EIS supplementation process has been treated under a rule of reason. Only rea-
sonable detail is required. Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 442 
(5th Cir. 1981). Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975) (§ 102(2)(c) 
compliance governed by "rule of reason"). 
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the EIS does for the project as originally conceived.46 Yet despite 
federal agencies' continuing obligations under the Act, courts limit 
review of NEPA violations to projects not complete at the time of 
trial. Courts have failed to recognize that the utility of the EIS as a 
means of implementing NEPA policy does not vanish upon comple-
tion of a project. 
II. COMPLETED PROJECTS: SHORTCOMINGS IN THE CURRENT 
REVIEW STANDARD 
The courts have consistently denied relief for noncompliance 
with the EIS process where the project sued upon has been com-
pleted.47 Often, an agency will modify a project during construction 
without studying or evaluating the environmental impact of the 
changes.48 Changes decided upon through such a process can cause 
needless environmental damage of the sort Congress intended 
NEPA to prevent.49 De~al of post-completion relief undermines the 
46. See National Indian Youth Council v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 649, 656, 660 (D.N.M. 
1980), qffd sub nom. National Indian Youth Council v. Watt, 664 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1981). 
The EIS supplement must contain the same sort of information contained in the original EIS. 
40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(4) (1981). 
47. Courts have reached this result in a variety of ways. Compare Ogunquit Village Corp. 
v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977) (acknowledging a NEPA violation, but declining to 
fashion a remedy) with City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979) (undertak-
ing contract analysis and concluding that the EIS did not bind defendants) and Mountain-
brook Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Adams, 492 F. Supp. 521 (W.D.N.C. 1979), qffd mem., 620 
F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1980) (denying any implied cause of action under NEPA). 
48. In Mountainbrook Homeowners Assn. v. Adams, 492 F. Supp. 521 (W.D.N.C. 1979), 
qffd., 620 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1980), the project itself was ongoing but the portion sued upon-
waste rock disposal - was finished. Indeed, this problem may arise any time an agency modi-
fies a discrete portion of a project in an environmentally damaging manner without supple-
menting the EIS. 
49. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text. Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 
F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977), is illustrative. 
In Ogunquit, the Soil Conservation Service (the "Service") restored a large san~ dune in 
Ogunquit, Maine. The dune and adjacent beach, which were composed of fine white quartz 
sand, created a large tourist industry for the village. In its EIS, the Service made no mention 
of the type of fill to be used for the restoration, though the EIS suggested that only compatible 
fill would be used. 553 F.2d at 245 (quoting from the trial court record). During construction, 
the Service exhausted the supply of inexpensive compatible fill and substituted gravel and 
coarse yellow sand. As a result, ''the famous white Ogunquit dune (became] an ugly yellow 
bunker," which largely destroyed Ogunquit's tourist industry. 553 F.2d at 244-47. The aes-
thetic destruction of the Ogunquit dune might have been avoided had the service invited pub-
lic comment on its decisions to complete the dune restoration with incompatible fill; economic 
exigencies did not dictate the decision to use incompatible fill. The project was completed for 
$443,015, nearly $400,000 under budget. In fact, the Service could substantially, if not com-
pletely, repair the dune within the amount originally allocated. 553 F.2d at 245. Despite its 
significant departure from the original plans, the Service failed to supplement the EIS, thereby 
precluding meaningful public input into a decision significantly affecting the Ogunquit com-
munity. The First Circuit, fearing a flood of belated litigation, denied post-completion relief 
and called for congressional action specifying procedures for "consideration and resolution of 
post-completion problems." 553 F.2d at 247. Ultimately, the court feared a "large, and un-
planned expenditure of public funds in undoing and redoing what has [already] been done," 
553 F.2d at 245. 
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policies animating NEPA. The reasons so far advanced for this re-
sult fail to justify insulating government noncompliance from any 
remedy whatsoever. 
A. .Denying Post-Completion Relief Frustrates NEPA Policies 
Courts denying post-completion relief undermine NEPA policy. 
First, denial of post-completion relief conflicts with the NEPA goal 
of improving the quality of agency decision-making.so The present 
rule encourages agencies to use the completed-project shield inten-
tionally51 or negligently to make environmentally unsound project 
changes.52 Even if a plaintiff can discover project changes,53 he may 
be unable to bring a lawsuit before the completion of the project.54 If 
decision-makers know that project changes may escape review, they 
may have no incentive to comply strictly with the requirements of 
NEPA. Accordingly, post-co;mpletion review may be the only means 
of ensuring agency compliance with NEPA for projects modified 
during construction. 
More commonly, the perception that the filing of the original EIS 
concludes the agency's responsibility to consider environmental val-
ues restores the pre-NEPA status quo. Project directors will there-
fore decide upon changes in response to political incentives without 
even the formal obligation to consider environmental conse-
quences. 55 Moreover, the absence of post-completion review will 
preclude both the reconsideration of previous project changes and 
the remaining possibilities for mitigating their adverse environmen-
50. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text. 
51. Ogunquit implied that a bad faith departure from the EIS might warrant relief. 553 
F.2d at 246. A "bad faith" standard for relief, however, presents two problems. First, proof of 
the agency's state of mind will be difficult. Unless the burden of proof is placed on the agency, 
no suit could likely succeed, especially in light of the somewhat amorphous character of an 
institutional mental state. Second, as a practical matter, an agency's casual indifference to 
environmental concerns, rather than hostility to the environment, presents the greater threat to 
NEPA. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text. 
52. Cf. Columbia Basin Land Protection Assn. v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 591-92 n.l 
(9th Cir. 1981) (If completion makes a project immune to suit, an agency "could merely ignore 
the requirements of NEPA, build its structures before a case gets to court, and then hide-be-
hind the mootness doctrine."). 
53. As a practical matter, citizens have the burden of finding out about proposed projects 
under NEPA. See N. ORLOFF, supra_ note 20, at 1-9. Denial of post-completion relief places 
the additional burden on potential plaintiffs of ~ntinually monitoring an agency's subsequent 
actions. It is not clear that Congress intended to so burden NEPA plaintiffs. See Note, Ogun-
quit Village Corp. v. Davis and Judicial Relief Under the National Environmental .Policy Act: 
The Completed Project Problem, 64 VA. L. REv. 629, 636-37 (1978). 
54. See, e.g., Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243, 244 (1st Cir. 1977) (The Serv-
ice began using incompatible fill in December of 1974. When the Village protested in January 
of 1975, the project had been completed.); Mountainbrook Homeowners Assn. v. Adams, 492 
F. Supp. 521, 529 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (Planti.lfs challenged waste rock disposal. Testimony at 
trial revealed that no more waste rock would .be dumped at the lots in question, thus that 
portion of the project was complete.), q/fd mem., 620 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1980). 
55. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text. 
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tal impacts.56 Post-completion review would more effectively ad-
vance NEPA's purpose of improving agency decision-making by 
ensuring due consideration of environmental values. 
Second, denial of post-completion relief frustrates the full disclo-
sure function of the Act.57 Given the heightened awareness of envi-
ronmental concerns in the last two decad~s, a federal agency may be 
reluctant to disclose voluntarily changes likely to increase public op-
position to a project.58 The courts' refusal to review an agency's de-
cision to modify a project effectively deprives the public of any 
"means for opehing up the agency decision-making process and sub-
jecting it to critical evaluation."59 Thus, even if the agency considers 
environmental questions not pressed upon it by the formal require-
ments of the Act, the absence of post-completion review nullifies the 
political accountability of decision-makers for the weight they ac-
cord environmental values. 
B. Countervailing Considerations Do Not Justify 
the Frustration of NEPA Policies 
Given that the denial of post-completion relief seriously jeopar-
dizes important NEPA purposes, only significant contrary concerns 
can justify the current case law. The courts·that have denied relief 
have relied upon equitable, prudential, and statutory justifications 
for this result. Several courts have rejected post-completion relief 
because of the equitable principle that the completion of activity 
which cannot be undone renders moot any question of enjoining that 
activity. 60 More recently, some courts have limited the purposes of 
NEPA to the planning stage of government projects. 61 And the First 
Circuit, in Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 62 expressed a prudential 
concern for burdening the implementation of public policy with af-
ter-the-fact litigation. 
The equitable concern is unpersuasive because it depends upon 
the assumption that the only possible relief is to enjoin a project al-
ready completed. Such a remedy would rarely justify its costs, and 
56. See notes 88-93 infra and accompanying text. 
51. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text. 
58. See generally Note, Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis and Judicial Relief Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act: The Completed Project Problem, 64 VA. L. REv. 629,636 
(1978). 
59. Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972). 
60. E.g., City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980); Florida Wild-
life Fedn. v. Goldschmidt, 611 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 
576 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978). 
61. See Richland Park Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1982); 
National Wildlife Fedn. v. Appalachian Regional Commn., 677 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980). 
62. 553 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1977). See note 49 supra. 
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might well cause more environmental damage than simply tolerating 
the NEPA violation. By contrast, requiring a supplemental EIS im-
poses minim.al costs, and significantly advances the policies of the 
Act.63 
The statutory objection appears more formidable. Several cir-
cuits have subscribed to the view that because ''the basic function of 
an EIS is to serve as a forward-looking instrument to assist in evalu-
ating 'proposals' for major federal action," the courts should "de-
cline, absent a showing of bad faith, to require an EIS as an after-
the-fact justification for a multi-phase development project already 
substantially completed."64 While plausible, this view of NEPA 
does not survive close scrutiny. 
Post-completion EIS supplementation, in contrast to dismantling 
an entire project, is forward-looking. Such a remedy would enhance 
environmental planning across three dimensions. First, EIS supple-
mentation would require decision-makers to take a ''hard look" at 
the available options for mitigating the adverse environmental im-
pacts of their prior failure to comply with NEPA.65 Second, the 
knowledge that the courts may require a post-completion supple-
ment would put officials on notice that the environmental awareness 
NEPA seeks to foster does not expire with the filing of the original 
EIS; the potential need to justify project changes in light of environ-
mental values will induce project directors to consider those values 
when they otherwise might not. Finally, post-completion supple-
mentation increases the accountability of public o~cials. 66 Denying 
the public the information required to shape future environmental 
planning through the political process because the provision of that 
information is not "forward-looking" protects officials responsible 
for NEPA violations in the name of the Act itself. This ironic result 
follows from a narrow, technical view of the policy formation pro-
cess, a vision limited to the perspective of "the engineer and the cost 
analyst."67 The Act, and its judicial development, leave little doubt 
that the statute's essential purpose is to broaden the policy-making 
process to encompass due consideration of environmental values.68 
Prudential fears that post-completion relief will interfere with the 
efficient operation of the government, or burden the courts with ex-
cessive after-the-fact litigation, do not justify so profound a frustra-
tion of the statutory purpose. Court-ordered EIS supplementation 
does not co~ct with the congressional judgment that substantive 
63. See notes 50-59 supra and accompanying text. 
64. Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1980). 
65. See notes 88-92 infta and accompanying text. 
66. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text. 
61. See note I4supra. 
68. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text. 
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decision-making authority belongs to federal agencies.69 The EIS is 
intended "to compel the decision maker to give serious weight to 
environmental factors in making discretionary choices,"70 though 
not as a means for courts to substitute their value judgment for sub-
stantive agency decisions.71 The EIS supplement remedy is proce-
dural: it merely requires an agency to p~oceed now in the manner it 
should have before the project was completed. 
Nor would the EIS supplement remedy depend upon more vague 
or difficult principles than familiar NEPA litigation; the courts could 
apply the same standards of substantive review to completed projects 
that they now apply to incomplete projects.72 Substantive review 
would extend to agency decisions made pursuant to the EIS supple-
ment. 73 Courts may grant relief where an agency's decision not to 
mitigate the adverse environmental effect of a completed project has 
given .clearly insufficient weight to environmental considerations, or 
was made in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The remedy for an 
arbitrary or capricious decision not to mitigate, or to mitigate in a 
way that gives clearly insufficient weight to environmental concerns, 
would be a court order to mitigate in the most efficient manner.74 
Although the availability of the EIS supplement remedy may in-
crease the amount of NEPA litigation, the increased caseload need 
not be burdensome. Courts could apply CEQ standards and grant 
relief only where the agency makes "substantial changes"75 in the 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972); Concerned About 
Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 454, 480-83 (D.D.C. 1975), revd. in part on other grounds 
sub nom. Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
70. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975). 
71. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971) (''The court 
is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."). 
72. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text. 
73. This, of course, would impose no greater judicial oversight of administrative agencies 
than NEPA already requires prior to the completion of a project. The supplement would 
primarily address impact mitigation alternatives such as add-ons, use restrictions, or partial or 
complete dismantling. The decision reviewed would be whether and how to mitigate, and the 
standard of review would be the same as for any other substantive decision. 
74. Again, however, the specifics of mitigation measures should be decided by the agency 
and submitted for final court approval. This will allow substantive review without imposing 
the co.urt's values on the administrative process. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 
410 n.21 (1976) (Court "cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive ns 
to the choice of action to be taken.'" (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972))). 
This would require the court to retain jurisdiction until it approves a proper plan, but 
courts of equity have historically done so. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoffman, 566 
F.2d 1060, 1071 (8th Cir. 1977) (imposing on the defendant "a continuing obligation to comply 
with" the procedures specified in the EIS). 
75. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(l)(i) requires agencies to ''prepare supplements to either draft or 
final environmental impact statements if . . . [t]he agency makes substantial changes in the 
proposed action that are relevant to environment concerns . • . ." See also Essex County Pres-
ervation Assn. v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956, 960-61 (1st Cir. 1976) (change in highway construc-
tion plans which would change use patterns required EIS supplement). Cf. Environmental 
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project whose effects the agency did not study in the original EIS.76 
This rule would preclude challenges to minor lapses in planning, as 
well as to changes that have an insignificant effect on the environ-
ment. 77 Further, the doctrine oflaches applies to NEPA litigation.78 
Thus no relief may be granted where a plainti1f s inexcusable delay 
results in prejudice to the defendant.79 Accordingly, extension of re-
lief to projects completed in violation of NEPA need not, as the 
Ogunquit court feared, "open up a vast number of projects to a flood 
of belated litigation."80 
Ill. A PROPOSED REMEDY FOR COMPLETED PROJECTS 
Most courts that deny post-completion relief simply refuse to or-
der a federal agency to complete its projects as specified in the EIS. 81 
Several courts, however, have considered less drastic post-comple-
tion remedies, though none has awarded such relief. 82 The inability 
Defense Fund v. Hoffinan, 566 F.2d 1060. 1071 (8th Cir. 1977) (where a mitigation procedure 
discussed in the EIS is later not adopted, a cause of action to halt construction pending NEPA 
compliance would arise). 
76. If the original EIS does not contain enough information to enable the decision-makers 
to consider fully the environmental consequences of any proper modifications, a court-ordered 
EIS supplement is appropriate. Cf. South Louisiana Environmental Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 
F.2d 1005, 1013 n.7 (5th Cir. 1980) (EIS is sufficient if it permits reasoned evaluation and 
decision.); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1299-300 (8th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States 
Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (An EIS is valid only if the 
Federal agency preparing it complies with a process of "individualized consideration and bal-
ancing of environmental factors . . . ."). 
77. NEPA "does not ... impose an impossible standard on the agency." Environmental 
Defense Fund v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1131 (5th Cir. 1974); 
see Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 798, 801 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1974). 
78. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 479 (5th Cir.), cert 
denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 549 F.2d 1021, 1027-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977). 
79. Courts may consider, however, the type of action involved in considering the applica-
bility oflaches. Specifically it may be relevant whether the plaintiff represents the public inter-
est, which would be best served by relief notwithstanding delay in bringing suit. See Steubing 
v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Tennessee Valley Auth., 468 F.2d 1164, 1176 (8th Cir. 1972) (If project is subject to NEPA, 
agency should not be permitted to rely on delay in claiming exemption). 
80. 553 F.2d at 245. 
81. See cases cited at note 47 supra. Cf. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 
644 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that NEPA creates no implied cause of action), cert. 
denied, 102 S. Ct. 977 (1982); City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 
1980) (holding post-completion suits are moot). 
82. See, e.g., Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243, 245-46 (1st Cir. 1977) (The 
court suggested, sua sponte, the alternate remedy of requiring EIS supplementation, but re-
jected it, saying: "[h]ere too, however, we face the problem of setting forth the criteria deter-
mining when such relief is appropriate." 553 F.2d at 245-46. It gave little substantive analysis 
to the merits of such a remedy.); cf. City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709, 712 (6th Cir. 
1979) (implying that a challenge to EIS sufficiency, even after project completion, might war-
rant relief.). 
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of the courts to fashion a suitable remedy for projects completed in 
violation of NEPA insulates agency decision-making from both the 
public and the courts, enabling agencies to act without giving full 
consideration to environmental concerns - precisely the result 
NEPA sought to avoid. 83 But the problems posed by denying post-
completion relief for NEPA violations can be resolved by extending 
to completed projects remedies available for incomplete projects. 
Courts should order federal agencies that have modified projects 
during construction to supplement the original EIS where it fails to 
describe accurately the completed project. Further, courts should, 
where proper, undertake substantive review of any agency decisions 
to proceed in a manner not specified in the EIS, as well as any subse-
quent decision made pursuant to t!te supplemented EIS. 
Even though the project sued upon has been completed, court-
ordered EIS supplementation promotes three basic NEPA goals: 
I) to enhance the quality of agency decision-making;84 2) to inform 
the public of federal decisions affecting the environment;85 and 3) to 
provide a record for substantive review.86 These advantages mirror 
the deficiencies in the current approach to post-completion NEPA 
litigation. 87 
First, study of project changes already implemented will improve 
the quality of agency decisions affecting the environment, notwith-
standing that the project sued upon has been completed. Where a 
completed project includes changes not studied in the original EIS, 
an EIS supplement will identify any additional adverse effect on the 
environment and alternative methods of minimizing such harm. 88 
83. See notes 50-59 supra and accompanying text. 
84. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text. 
85. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text. 
86. See text at note 35 supra. 
81. See notes 50-59 supra and accompanying text. 
88. The requirement that an EIS supplement consider ways to mitigate the adverse conse-
quences of project changes is analogous to the requirement that the original EIS consider 
alternatives to the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ili). Both requirements are in-
tended to ensure that the best decision will be made by increasing the number of choices 
available to the decision-maker. Cf. cases cited at note 28supra (one goal of the EIS process is 
to enhance the quality of agency decisions). Although some alternatives are no longer avail-
able after a project is completed (e.g., different project site, abandoning the project), there 
usually remain economical means of mitigating a project's adverse environmental effects. For 
example, in Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243, 245 (1st Cir. 1977), only half of 
the allocated budget had been spent on the dune restoration. The adverse effects of the project 
could have been substantially mitigated within the original budget. 553 F.2d at 245. In City of 
Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979), the challenged project was an airport 
runway for which anti-jet regulations had been removed without EIS supplementation. Such 
regulation could easily have been reinstated if, upon adequate EIS study, it had been found 
beneficial to do so. In Mountainbrook Homeowners Assn. v. Adams, 492 F. Supp. 521, 525 
(W.D.N.C. 1979), qffd. mem., 620 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1980), the challenged project allegedly did 
not follow specifications for contouring waste rock at disposal site. If such grading was cost-
beneficial when originally considered, it would likely have remained so. 
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Quite often, completed projects can be inexpensively modified to 
mitigate the environmental harm caused by the changes not studied 
in the original EIS. 89 Preparation of an EIS supplement,90 like the 
original EIS,91 requires the agency to study any changes and their 
impact on the environment, disclose its findings to the public, receive 
comments from other agencies and the public, and consider viable 
alternatives. This process increases the flow of information to the 
decision-maker, enabling a more fully informed consideration of 
what steps, if any, should be taken to mitigate the environmental 
harm caused by the project.92 In short, the EIS supplement func-
tions, as does the EIS,93 as a decision-making tool notwithstanding _ 
the completion of the contested project. 
Further, information regarding the additional environmental im-
pact of previously unstudied changes may prove useful for planning 
similar or related projects.94 Although the EIS and EIS supplement 
function chiefly to improve decisions concerning the project for 
which they were prepared,95 the EIS also collects data for evaluating 
other federaJ. actions.96 Court-ordered EIS supplementation for 
89. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commn., 606 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court held that the Energy Research and De-
velopment Administration (ERDA) ''violated NEPA by failing to consider specific design and 
safety features that could be incorporated into the planned [nuclear waste storage] tanks." 606 
F.2d at 1272. The court remanded the case to the district court for entry of an order requiring 
ERDA to supplement the EIS, largely because "[i]t may still be possible, upon completion of 
an adequate EIS, for the agency to decide that it is worthwhile to modify the [nuclear waste 
storage) tanks." 606 F.2d at 1272. Even if the storage tanks at issue had been completed at the 
time of trial, an EIS supplement studying alternative design and safety features would remain 
useful in deciding whether this specific project should be modified. 
90. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (1980). 
91. The EIS supplement fulfills substantially the same purposes as the EIS does. See Essex 
County Preservation Assn. v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956, 961 (1st Cir. 1976); National Indian 
Youth Council v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 649, 660 (D.N.M. 1980), q/fd sub nom., National 
Indian Youth Council v. Watt, 644 F. 2d 220 (10th Cir. 1981). 
92. Cf. notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text. 
93. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). 
94. An EIS for a completed project may be useful where impact predictions and correla-
tions apply to subsequent projects. Further, the comprehensive impact of several proximate 
projects may be different than the "sum" of the individual impacts. See generally Casenote, 
Environmental Law- Environmental Impact Statements- Threshold Application of Compre-
hensive Planning Under NEPA, 52 N.D. L. REv. 601, 606-08 (1976). 
95. See cases cited at note 28 supra. . 
96. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commn., 606 F.2d 1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (study of safety and design features for nuclear 
waste disposal tanks would be useful for future projects); Society for Animal Rights, Inc. v. 
Schlesinger, 512 F.2d 915, 917-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (suggesting post-completion EIS be used to 
determine future application of a bird extermination process); cf. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Gallaway, 524 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 1975) (requiring EIS for dredging project to 
include information on cumulative impact of proposed and existing projects); Scenic Rivers 
Assn. of Okla. v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 245 (10th Cir. 1975) (One of the purposes of the EIS "is 
to require the giving of attention to environmental problems regardless of whether the agency 
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projects completed in violation of NEPA would also promote this 
secondary information-gathering purpose of the Act. 
Second, court-ordered EIS supplementation for NEPA violators 
furthers the full disclosure goal of NEP A.97 Since the EIS supple-
ment not only describes the project changes, but explains the reasons 
for such changes,98 the supplement renders agencies accountable for 
decisions affecting the environment. The availability of this inf or-
mation enables the public to evaluate the federal government's per-
formance.99 Thus, even for irrevocable project changes, the EIS 
supplement promotes the full disclosure policy underlying NEPA. 
Finally, the EIS supplement provides a record for substantive re-
view in the event that a plaintiff challenges the project changes.100 
Here also, the EIS supplement achieves its purpose despite the com-
pletion of the challenged project. 
CONCLUSION 
NEPA clearly should not be applied identically to both complete 
and incomplete projects. Yet, if completion immunizes a project 
from suit, an agency "could merely ignore the requirements of 
NEPA, build its structures before a case gets to court, and then hide 
behind the mootness doctrine."101 Court-ordered EIS supplementa-
tion for projects completed in violation of NEPA would not only 
remove this shield, but would advance many of the purposes Con-
gress intended the original EIS to serve. 
NEPA should not, as the Ogunquit plaintiff contended, become 
the basis for enforcement of EIS regulations as promises. The Act 
was formulated not to bind agencies to their decisions, but to im-
prove agency decisions and to bring the decision-making process 
within public reach. Extension of procedural and substantive review 
to completed projects offers an efficient means of achieving this goal. 
has authority to do anything about it".), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. 
v. Scenic Rivers Assn. of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976). 
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